Publicly disclosed information for this event

Index Number:

Title:

2022_021

Several cases of AIS spoofing in the context of the Russian/Ukraine conflict. Probably achieved out [...]

Day	Month	Year	Country	Activity	Incident Type
26	February	2022	Ukraine	Ship	GPS/AIS jamming/spoofing

Summary

Several cases of AIS spoofing in the context of the Russian/Ukraine conflict. Probably achieved out of the RF spectrum (ie on the API of certain AIS fusion web portals).

Victim

N/A

Claimed/Reported Threat Actor

N/A

Origin

Political

Main impact

Integrity

References

https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/anonymous-vladimir-putin-yacht-fckptn-b2024780.html

Recommendations to Ship to reduce GPS/AIS jamming/spoofing risks:

Implement verification mechanisms for GPS and AIS data.
Use multiple sources of location (other GNSS constellation, physical checks) to cross-verify GPS/AIS information.
Regularly monitor for signal interference and anomalies in navigation systems.
Use Controlled Radiation Pattern Antennas.
Educate personnel about the risks and signs of GPS/AIS spoofing attacks.
Work with your CSIRT organization to know the geographical zones at risk.

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Disclaimer: the data are provided as is. France Cyber Maritime and the M-CERT take no responsibility for the soundness, quality, precision, nor the eventual attribution made by the referenced URLs. We give a lot of respect and support to the victims of attacks. Yes, there are no common and shared incident IDs in cyber (for now!).

Files generated on Thursday, 02nd November 2023.
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